Rise
of
the
Stupid
Network
Why
the
Intelligent
Network
was
once
a
good
idea,
but
isn't
anymore.
One
telephone
company
nerd's
odd
perspective
on
the
changing
value
proposition.
David
Isenberg
--
isen@research.att.com
(973)360-8225
Opportunity
Discovery
Department,
AT&T
Labs
--
Research
June
4,
1997
INTRODUCTION:
OBSOLETE
ASSUMPTIONS
&
ENDURING
MENTAL
MODELS
Design-by-assumption
works
as
long
as
assumptions
hold.
Assumptions
are
shortcuts
to
useful
efficiencies,
provided
they
are
not
violated.
The
classic
telephone
company
value
proposition,
embodied
in
today's
telephone
network,
holds:
*
that
expensive,
scarce
infrastructure
can
be
shared
to
offer
premium
priced
services,
*
that
talk
--
the
human
voice
--
generates
most
of
the
traffic,
*
that
circuit-switched
calls
are
the
"communications
technologies"
that
matter,
and
*
that
the
telephone
company
is
in
control
of
its
network.
Telephone
companies
still
behave
as
if
these
assumptions
hold
despite:
*
up
to
several
thousand-fold
declines
in
key
infrastructure
costs
over
the
last
two
decades
*
a
20
year
double-digit
annual
growth
rate
in
the
volume
of
data
traffic,
so
that
the
volume
of
data
traffic
is
now
overtaking
the
(also
growing,
but
more
slowly)
volume
of
voice
traffic,
*
the
many
different
data
types
that
now
travel
over
the
telephone
network
(despite
the
fact
that
the
network
is
not
optimized
for
all
these
data
types),
*
the
many
different
types
of
"communications
technologies,"
from
television
to
Ethernet,
that
are
not
part
of
telephone
network
architecture,
and
*
the
Internet,
which,
because
it
makes
the
details
of
network
operation
irrelevant,
is
shifting
control
to
the
end
user.
The
Intelligent
Network
is
a
straight-line
extension
of
the
four
assumptions
above
--
scarcity,
voice,
circuit
switching,
and
control.
Its
primary
design
impetus
was
not
customer
service.
Rather,
the
Intelligent
Network
was
a
telephone
company
attempt
to
engineer
vendor
independence,
more
automatic
operation,
and
some
"intelligent"
new
services
into
existing
network
architecture.
However,
even
as
it
rolls
out
and
matures,
the
Intelligent
Network
is
being
superseded
by
a
Stupid
Network:
*
with
nothing
but
dumb
transport
in
the
middle,
and
intelligent
user-controlled
endpoints,
*
whose
design
is
guided
by
plenty,
not
scarcity,
*
where
transport
is
guided
by
the
needs
of
the
data,
not
the
design
assumptions
of
the
network.
The
Stupid
Network
is
not
all
here
yet.
It
is
in
its
infancy.
It
needs
to
get
stronger
and,
well,
a
bit
more
coordinated.
Some
telephone
company
people
realize
that
things
are
changing,
and
must
change.
But
they
are
hemmed
in
by
conscious,
deliberate,
long
established
telephone
company
practices.
Many
are
also
hobbled
by
less
conscious
telephone
company
mental
models
of
"communications,"
"technology,"
and
"customer
needs."
While
these
people
may
realize
that
the
old
ways
are
becoming
obsolete,
they
live
in
a
world
conditioned
by
an
encompassing,
arcane
legacy
that
only
remembers
"rational,"
incremental
change.
(Note:
here
"telephone
company"
refers
to
large
companies
whose
main
business
is
to
provide
circuit
switched
voice
calling
service.
In
the
United
States,
most
of
these
are
the
heirs
of
the
Bell
System
legacy
--
but
Sprint,
MCI,
GTE,
SNET,
and
others
might
also
try
on
this
shoe,
and
if
it
fits...)
COMPUTERS
AS
SCARCE
RESOURCES
It
used
to
be
more
expensive
to
complete
telephone
calls
than
it
is
today.
The
operator-completed
call
gave
way
to
call
completion
by
electro-mechanical
switch.
Then,
in
the
late
70s,
the
era
of
computer
controlled
electronic
switching
made
placing
calls
even
cheaper
and
more
reliable.
In
those
days,
computers,
including
those
that
controlled
switching,
were
still
considered
expensive,
scarce
resources.
When
I
worked
in
the
nascent
electronic
toy
industry
in
1979,
a
single
insight
that
eliminated
six
transistors
paid
my
way.
And
the
same
factor
--
the
need
to
save
two
expensive
bytes
of
memory
--
laid
the
basis
in
this
era
for
the
Year
2000
Problem
(stay
tuned
to
the
eleventh
hour
news
for
more
on
THIS
story!).
Now
computer
circuits
are
thousands
of
times
cheaper.
Moore's
Law
is
what
we
call
the
ongoing
improvement
in
computing
cost
and
power.
But
in
the
70s
it
was
not
generally
known
to
be
a
`law'
--
to
most
telecommunications
engineers
(and
to
humanity
in
general),
it
has
become
the
most
game-changing
wild
card
played
in
recent
times.
Telephone
networks
have
been
designed
for
optimal
use
of
scarce
resources.
The
local
exchange
in
your
city,
which
handles
the
last
four
digits
of
your
telephone
number,
theoretically
could
handle
up
to
10,000
telephones,
e.g.,
with
numbers
510-547-0000,
0001,
0002,
et
cetera
through
510-547-9999.
But
the
switching
office
is
not
designed
to
handle
10,000
simultaneous
calls.
It
is
designed
to
handle
far
fewer,
maybe
one
tenth
of
that,
based
on
the
assumption
that
even
in
the
busiest
time
of
the
day,
only
a
fraction
of
its
telephones
will
be
active
at
any
one
time.
The
network
works
as
long
as
engineering
assumptions
(e.g.,
the
length
of
a
call,
the
number
of
call
attempts,
etc.)
do
not
change.
But
let
the
assumptions
change
episodically
(e.g.,
Rolling
Stones
tickets
go
on
sale),
or
structurally
(calls
to
Internet
service
providers
last
several
times
longer
than
voice
calls),
and
the
network
hits
its
design
limits
-
completing
a
call
becomes
a
matter
of
try,
try
again.
What
if
network
design
were
based
on
another
assumption
--
that
computation
and
bandwidth
were
cheap
and
plentiful?
DOING
"INTELLIGENT"
THINGS
WITH
PHONE
CALLS
Once
the
telephone
companies
began
doing
digital
switching,
the
idea
that
you
could
do
"intelligent"
things
with
calls
was
not
far
behind.
The
concept
of
network
control
was
extended
to
let
various
centralized
resources
-
digital
switches,
databases
(Service
Control
Points)
and
signal
processing
systems
(Intelligent
Peripherals)
--
communicate
among
each
other
by
extending
the
telephone
network's
control
protocol
(SS7).
As
noted
above,
the
main
force
motivating
the
Intelligent
Network
was
a
telephone
company
attempt
at
"vendor
independence"
so
telephone
companies
could
get
better
deals
from
their
suppliers.
Thus,
Intelligent
Network
specs
were
meant
to
encourage
vendors
to
design
their
equipment
to
work
in
a
multi-vendor
environment
--
to
interoperate.
As
a
side
benefit,
almost
an
afterthought,
some
of
the
newly
specified
equipment
could
also
interoperate
with
the
business
systems
of
certain
customers
--
but
only
via
limited,
cautiously
designed
interfaces.
Virtually
all
of
these
services
center
around
call
completion,
automation,
and
billing.
This,
in
a
nutshell,
is
the
concept
marketed
as
the
Intelligent
Network.
Some
Intelligent
Network
service
examples
include:
*
Routing
calls
to
different
numbers
than
the
one
that
the
caller
originally
dialed
(this
is
the
basis
of
e.g.,
800
service).
*
Giving
caller
choices
before
the
call
is
completed
("push
one
for
domestic
reservations,"
etc.).
*
Saying,
"Calling
Card,
Collect,
Third-Party,
or
Operator"
to
control
payment
options.
*
Verifying
that
the
calling
card
number
is
valid
in
"real
time."
*
Supplying
calling
party
numbers
directly
to
customers
for
database
lookup
(which
is
why
I
must
verify
from
my
home
phone
that
I
got
my
Citibank
card
in
the
mail).
Expensive
computers,
intertwined
in
central
network
operations,
do
this.
Belief
becomes
reality.
But
wait!
The
telephone
companies
are
now
losing
design
hegemony
--
the
news
that
"The
Internet
is
here!"
is
beginning
to
penetrate
the
telephone
company
inner
sanctum.
MEETING
CUSTOMER
NEEDS
The
astute
reader
might
by
now
suspect
that
the
main
beneficiaries
of
the
Intelligent
Network
are
the
telephone
companies
themselves.
Nevertheless,
telephone
companies
propound
a
"philosophy"
that
the
Intelligent
Network
makes
it
easy
to
introduce
new
services
and
new
technologies,
and
to
meet
new
customer
needs.
New
customer
needs,
when
they
are
detected,
filter
into
the
telephone
company
slowly.
Some
needs,
the
ones
with
big,
obvious,
immediate
payoffs,
get
attention
from
decision
makers,
who
then
request
a
business
case,
which
must
then
get
approved.
The
next
step
is
the
development
plan,
followed
by
the
Operations,
Administration,
Maintenance,
and
Provisioning
Plans.
Then
if
all
goes
well,
the
telephone
company
might
begin
the
process
of
implementation.
This
can
take
years,
or
even
decades
(witness
ISDN).
If
you
hate
hanging
on
hold,
you
are
part
of
a
huge
latent
market
--
do
you
know
anybody
who
doesn't?
Yet,
telephone
companies
have
yet
to
use
Intelligent
Network
capabilities
to
effectively
ameliorate
this
problem.
Now,
suppose
Internet
Telephony
gets
as
good
as
telephone
company
telephony
(see
below),
and
some
enterprising
independent
programmer
wants
to
make
a
product
that
solves
the
problem
of
being
on
hold.
They
would
simply
write
an
end-user
application
and
sell
it
from
their
web
site.
If
it
works,
and
people
like
it,
they
will
sell
lots
of
it.
If
not,
they
might
try
again.
But
they
don't
have
to
go
through
any
long,
bureaucratic
economic
justification,
business
planning,
and
technical
development
processes
--
they
just
do
it.
Internet
Telephony,
because
the
Internet
Protocol
works
at
the
level
that
user
software
manages
the
session,
takes
the
telephone
company
out
of
the
value
equation.
THE
INTERNET
DIS-INTERMEDIATES
THE
TELEPHONE
NETWORK
The
Internet
breaks
the
telephone
company
model
by
passing
control
to
the
end
user.
It
does
this
by
taking
the
underlying
network
details
out
of
the
picture.
Let's
look
at
how
this
works
in
the
case
of
voice.
To
the
telephone
company,
there
is
one
main
way
of
transmitting
voice
--
sampled
in
8
bit
bytes,
8000
times
a
second,
for
an
aggregate
rate
of
64
kbit/s.
The
entire
telephone
network
is
designed
around
this
rate.
But
if
you
want
to
send
voice
on
the
Internet,
you
can
encode
it
at
any
rate
you
want,
and
send
it
at
any
rate
up
to
the
one
that
the
slowest
underlying
network
link
supports.
The
recipient
must
have
the
right
decoder
running
in
her
intelligent
terminal,
too.
The
very
name,
Internet,
denotes
that
it
is
designed
to
network
networks.
You
can
use
Internet
Protocol
on
an
Ethernet
to
communicate
with
an
X.25
network,
an
FDDI
network,
or
a
modem
--
lower
layer
protocols
are
submerged,
made
irrelevant.
So
if
you
are
on
an
(e.g.,
10Mbit/s)
Ethernet,
and
your
endpoint
application
wants
to
send
better
quality
256
kbit/s
voice,
no
problem.
You
can't
do
that
with
the
telephone
network.
Or,
with
a
different
application
(on
the
same
endpoint
and
network)
you
can
send
six
different
interwoven
10
kbit/s
voice
streams
to
six
different
destinations
at
the
same
time.
And
you
don't
have
to
tell
your
Stupid
Network
provider
anything
about
it,
or
pay
a
premium
to
install
anything
special.
The
network
provider
becomes
virtually
irrelevant
--
the
user
controls
the
relevant
capabilities.
TRUE
VOICE,
FALSE
START
I
contrast
the
flexibility
of
a
Stupid
Network
with
my
experience
as
a
member
of
AT&T's
True
Voice
technical
team.
AT&T
True
Voice
was
a
valiant
attempt
to
improve
circuit
switched
voice
quality
as
much
as
possible
in
the
context
of
current
network
architecture.
If
we
had
not
been
constrained
by
network
architecture,
the
easiest
way
would
have
been
to
increase
the
sampling
rate
or
change
the
coding
algorithm.
But
to
actually
do
this,
we
would
have
had
to
change
every
piece
of
the
telephone
network
except
the
wires.
So
we
had
to
work
within
the
designed
64
kbit/s
data
rate.
An
astute
AT&T
perceptual
psychophysicist
(and
a
friend
of
mine)
determined
that
voice
quality
could
be
substantially
improved
by
boosting
the
bass
part
of
the
signal,
that
part
of
the
audio
spectrum
between
100
and
300
cycles
per
second.
But
as
we
set
out
to
implement
this
conceptually
simple
improvement,
we
kept
running
into
the
problem
that
there
were
too
many
places
in
the
network
that
had
built
in
"intelligent"
assumptions
about
the
voice
signal
--
echo
cancellers,
conference
bridges,
voice
messaging
systems,
etc.
--
and
too
many
devices
that
depended
on
these
acoustic
assumptions
for
their
correct
operation
--
modems,
fax
machines,
and
a
surprising
number
of
strange
devices
with
proprietary
analog
protocols.
After
about
two
years
of
intense
effort,
we
made
a
noticeable
difference,
one
that
most
listeners
preferred
(if
asked
explicitly),
but
it
was
not
as
large
as
it
could
have
been.
There
was
too
much
"intelligence"
intertwined
with
the
basic
transport.
The
True
Voice
experience
led
me
to
see
the
advantages
of
a
network
--
a
Stupid
Network
--
that
would
let
you
stuff
bits
in
one
end
and
get
them
out
the
other
without
getting
tangled
up
in
cobwebs
of
legacy
assumptions.
Want
a
different
voice
quality?
With
a
Stupid
Network,
you'd
get
a
different
program,
install
it
in
your
intelligent
end
user
device
and
run
it.
A
NETWORK
ENGINEERED
FOR
USE
There
is
no
longer
first-order
economic
justification
for
a
telephone
company
to
engineer
and
control
scarce,
expensive,
network
resources
--
the
basic
conditions
no
longer
obtain.
The
age
of
plentiful
computing
is
here.
I
have
a
multi-color,
three
dimensional
screen
saver
that
uses
the
entire
capacity
of
my
200
MHz
Pentium.
The
designers
of
the
Intelligent
Network
never
imagined
such
"wasteful"
use
of
processing
"intelligence."
The
age
of
plentiful
bandwidth
is
just
around
the
corner,
as
several
families
of
technologies
(fiber,
satellite,
cable
modems,
xDSL,
LMDS,
and
low
power
TV,
to
name
just
six)
line
up
to
break
the
local
bandwidth
bottleneck,
and
as
the
capacity
of
backbone
fiber
has
risen
from
2
to
6
to
10,
20
and
40
Gbit/s
over
just
the
last
few
years.
The
age
of
centralized
control
is
ending
too,
with
the
rise
of
the
next
generation
of
Internet
--
and
especially
the
appearance
of
circuit-like
Internet
mechanisms,
such
as
those
in
the
latest
version
of
Internet
Protocol
(IPv6),
designed
to
tame
delay
and
improve
real-time
two-way
Internet
voice.
JUST
DELIVER
THE
BITS,
STUPID
A
new
network
"philosophy
and
architecture,"
is
replacing
the
vision
of
an
Intelligent
Network.
The
vision
is
one
in
which
the
public
communications
network
would
be
engineered
for
"always-on"
use,
not
intermittence
and
scarcity.
It
would
be
engineered
for
intelligence
at
the
end-user's
device,
not
in
the
network.
And
the
network
would
be
engineered
simply
to
"Deliver
the
Bits,
Stupid,"
not
for
fancy
network
routing
or
"smart"
number
translation.
Fundamentally,
it
would
be
a
Stupid
Network.
In
the
Stupid
Network,
the
data
would
tell
the
network
where
it
needs
to
go.
(In
contrast,
in
a
circuit
network,
the
network
tells
the
data
where
to
go.)
In
a
Stupid
Network,
the
data
on
it
would
be
the
boss.
Instead
of
fancy
"intelligent"
network
routing
translation,
in
a
Stupid
Network,
intelligent
end-user
devices
would
be
connected
to
one
or
more
high
speed
access
networks
--
always
listening
for
relevant
information,
for
data
addressed
to
their
owner.
Sometimes
a
"communication"
might
be
a
few
bits,
perhaps
a
short,
pager-type
message.
Other
times,
it
might
be
longer,
like
email.
In
the
event
of
the
need
for
two-way
voice
communication,
an
initial
message
might
state
the
identity
of
the
"caller,"
and/or
inquire
of
the
whereabouts
of
the
owner.
The
intelligent
end-user
device
could
apply
its
knowledge
of
where
its
"owner"
was,
and
who
the
caller
was.
Then,
if
it
were
programmed
to
do
so,
it
could
launch
a
message
to
its
owner,
telling
of
the
call,
the
caller's
identity,
location,
and
any
other
information.
It
could
also
forward
as
much
information
as
practical.
End
user
devices
would
be
free
to
behave
flexibly
because,
in
the
Stupid
Network
the
data
is
boss,
bits
are
essentially
free,
and
there
is
no
assumption
that
the
data
is
of
a
single
data
rate
or
data
type.
IDIOT
SAVANT
BEHAVIORS
FOR
DIFFERENT
DATA
TYPES
In
the
current
telephone
network,
voice
is
the
assumed
data
type,
unless
specially
ordered,
high
cost
services
are
ordered.
But
in
the
Stupid
Network,
because
the
data
is
the
boss,
it
can
tell
the
network,
in
real
time,
what
kind
of
service
it
needs.
And
the
Stupid
Network
would
have
a
small
repertoire
of
idiot-savant
behaviors
to
treat
different
data
types
appropriately.
If
the
data
identified
itself
as
financial
data,
the
Stupid
Network
would
deliver
it
accurately,
no
matter
how
many
milliseconds
of
delay
the
error
checking
would
take.
If
the
data
were
two-way
voice
or
video,
the
Stupid
Network
would
provide
low
delay,
even
at
the
price
of
an
occasional
flipped
bit.
If
the
data
were
entertainment
audio
or
video,
the
Stupid
Network
would
provide
wider
bandwidth,
but
would
not
necessarily
give
low
delay
or
absolute
accuracy.
And
if
there
were
a
need
for
unique
transmission
characteristics,
the
data
would
tell
the
Stupid
Network
in
more
detail
how
to
treat
it,
and
the
Stupid
Network
would
do
what
it
was
told.
The
Stupid
Network
would
let
you
send
mixed
data
types
at
will
--
limited
only
by
the
knowledge
and
imagination
of
the
application
programmer
community.
One
way
voice
messages,
multi-way
voice
conferences,
two-way
video,
email,
documents,
audio
and/or
video
entertainment,
whatever,
could
be
mixed
and
interspersed
at
will,
within
and
between
sessions.
You
would
not
have
to
ask
your
Stupid
Network
provider
for
any
special
network
modifications
--
its
only
function
would
be
to,
"Deliver
the
Bits,
Stupid."
One
thing
about
the
Stupid
Network
is
clear
--
the
physical
elements
that
comprise
the
network
would
be
neither
expensive
nor
scarce.
There
would
be
little
profit
margin
in
shipping
dumb
bits.
There
would
be
lots
of
high
value
Business
Ideas
supported
by
the
Stupid
Network,
above
and
beyond
transport.
LEADING
INDICATORS
A
rudimentary
form
of
the
Stupid
Network
--
the
Internet
--
is
here
today.
The
telephone
companies
are
beginning
to
realize
this.
Fearing
erosion
of
their
control
and,
more
importantly,
their
revenue
stream,
they
have
been
quick
to
call
for
the
banning
of
Internet
Telephony,
quick
to
call
for
the
federal
imposition
of
charges
on
Internet
access,
and
slow
to
implement
widely
available,
reasonably
priced
broadband
services.
This
creates
a
chicken
and
egg
problem
--
while
the
hungry
wait
for
dinner
and
breakfast.
A
powerful
leading
indicator
of
the
Stupid
Network
will
arrive
when
entrepreneurs
who
have
no
vested
interest
in
maintaining
telephone
company
assumptions
begin
to
offer
profitable,
affordable,
widely
available
data
services.
Watch
Metricom's
Ricochet
modem
service,
an
early
entry
in
this
market.
Will
entrepreneurial
broadband
service
follow?
There
are
several
early
efforts,
for
example,
Sky
Station
International,
which
plans
to
launch
self-propelled
balloon-based
transcievers
over
major
cities
to
deliver
personal
1.5
Mbit/s
service.
Meanwhile,
we
will
see
how
advances
in
Internet
Technology
(such
as
IPv6
and
the
Internet
II
initiative
of
leading
universities)
evolve
--
here
the
ability
of
the
Internet
to
offer
low
delay
services,
such
as
two-way
voice,
is
the
key
indicator.
To
counter
these
threats,
the
telephone
companies
are
now
speeding
deployment
of
Intelligent
Network
services,
much
like
sailing
merchants
responded
to
the
threat
of
steam
by
inventing
faster
sailing
ships
in
the
mid
1800s.
The
beneficiaries
of
this
accelerated
Intelligent
Network
deployment
are
big
businesses
--
who
can
offer
cheaper
help-desk
type
services
with
lower
human
labor
costs.
Nevertheless,
despite
this
current
Intelligent
Network
buy-in,
if
big
business
finds
that
it
is
better
served
by
the
Stupid
Network
and
premises
based
intelligence,
it
will
not
hesitate
to
switch.
The
Telecom
Act
of
1996
and
the
World
Trade
Organization
telecom
agreement
of
1997
can
be
seen
as
attempts
to
preserve
oligopolistic
hegemony
of
the
telephone
companies.
The
thrust
of
both
is
to
allow
big
companies
to
band
together
to
create
a
marketplace
dominated
by
a
few
large
players
in
place
of
government
control.
Will
there
be
unintended
consequences
of
these
agreements?
Count
on
it!
Will
they
hasten
or
impede
the
advent
of
the
Stupid
Network?
Hmmm.
THE
STUPID
NETWORK'S
NEW
VALUE
PROPOSITION
The
shift
from
scarcity
to
plenty
is
often
the
harbinger
of
new
value
propositions.
For
example,
as
computer
power
got
cheaper
and
cheaper
in
the
1980s,
there
was
much
talk
of
a
shift
in
value
from
hardware
to
software,
but
it
was
not
easy
to
see
how
the
shift
would
unfold.
In
fact,
it
appears
that
only
one
person
(Bill
Gates)
understood
it
fully.
The
changes
that
now
portend
the
Stupid
Network
are
likely
to
shift
the
telecommunications
value
proposition
from
"network
services"
to
something
else.
If
I
knew
what
it
was,
I
would
not
be
wasting
my
time
writing
these
words.
Given
that
disclaimer,
I
have
three
brief
observations:
1.
It
is
rare
that
a
market
is
completely
killed
by
the
next
generation
of
technology.
Neither
TV
nor
the
VCR
killed
the
movies.
Neither
the
minicomputer
(alas,
remember
them?)
nor
the
PC
killed
the
Mainframe.
We
still
have
ships
and
railroads,
though
their
markets
are
both
diminished
and
changed
by
the
car
and
airplane.
The
"paperless
office"
exists
--
but
mine
is
cluttered
with
books,
memos
and
magazines
that
are
printed
on
paper.
So
it
is
likely
that
the
Stupid
Network
and
the
Intelligent
Network
will
exist
side
by
side
for
some
time,
or
even
share
merged
definitions,
functions,
and
value.
It
is
also
likely
that
"deliver
the
bits"
companies
will
exist
in
a
Stupid
Network
world,
but
given
much
lower
profit
margins,
they
will
not
look
much
like
telephone
companies.
2.
Telephone
companies
themselves
could
cannibalize
their
own
product.
Smarter
companies
often
field
new
products
that
replace
current
profitable
product.
*
Sony
does
this
several
times
a
year
--
it
tries
to
learn
from
its
own
mistakes
faster
than
its
competition,
fielding
new
products
that
improve
on
its
old
before
such
improvements
become
obvious
to
their
foe.
*
Boeing
does
it
--
the
757
and
767
cut
into
the
top
of
its
727
market
and
the
bottom
of
its
747
market
with
fuel
efficient,
and
crew
efficient
new
designs
--
we
can
only
hope
that
Boeing
does
not
become
complacent
now
that
it
is
has
beat
out
its
strongest
competitors.
*
Intel
does
it
--
having
been
the
first
to
articulate
Moore's
Law,
it
now
drives
it
with
a
new,
more
powerful
chip
every
18
months
or
so,
long
before
the
old
chip
is
obsolete
--
it
realizes
that
if
it
stops,
there
are
other
chip
makers
that
would
be
glad
to
take
leadership
of
that
market.
Telephone
companies
could
do
it
too,
but
it
is
unlikely
as
long
as
their
senior
managers
prefer
to
talk
with
lawyers,
regulators,
consultants
and
financiers
more
than
with
experts
in
their
own
employ.
3.
Telephone
companies
could
reinvent
a
place
for
themselves
as
purveyors
of
new
values
propositions
brought
by
the
Stupid
Network.
They
will
have
to,
because
their
old
value
proposition
will
erode
as
the
Stupid
Network
grows.
In
a
"deliver
the
bits"
world,
so
much
information,
and
so
many
courses
of
action,
will
be
available,
that
there
will
be
a
great
need
for
known,
trusted
authorities.
Businesses
with
brand
reputation
and
staying
power
will
be
guarantors
of
transactions,
holders
of
critical
information,
organizers
and
filters
of
information,
and
even
voices
of
reason,
leadership,
and
"objectivity."
(Of
course,
they
will
need
to
HAVE
reason,
leadership,
and
objectivity
to
do
this.)
There
will
be
other
roles
for
big
companies
in
the
world
of
the
Stupid
Network,
and
"forgetting
organizations,"
who
are
able
to
abandon
old
models
when
new
ways
no
longer
support
old
assumptions,
will
find
them.
THE
CHOICE
BETWEEN
LIVING
AND
DYING
Former
Shell
Group
Planning
Head,
Arie
deGeus,
in
his
master
work,
"The
Living
Company"
(Harvard,
Boston,
1997),
examined
thousands
of
companies
to
try
to
discover
what
it
takes
to
adapt
to
changing
conditions.
He
found
that
the
life
expectancy
of
the
average
company
was
only
40
years
--
this
means
that
telephone
company
culture
is
in
advanced
old
age.
De
Geus
also
studied
27
companies
that
had
been
able
to
survive
over
100
years.
He
concluded
that
managing
for
longevity
--
to
maximize
the
chances
that
a
company
will
adapt
to
changes
in
the
business
climate
--
is
very
different
than
managing
for
profit.
For
example,
in
the
former,
employees
are
part
of
a
larger,
cohesive
whole,
a
work
community.
In
the
latter,
employees
are
"resources"
to
be
deployed
or
downsized
as
business
dictates.
As
the
Stupid
Network
arrives,
as
the
business
idea
shifts
from
scarce
physical
infrastructure
to
something
more
knowledge
based,
company
culture
will
need
to
adapt
to
the
truth
that,
"Nobody
knows
as
much
as
all
of
us."
Whatever
we
discover
to
be
the
new
Stupid
Network
value
proposition,
my
working
hypothesis
is
that
it
will
be
based
on
intelligent
end
user
devices,
intelligent
customers,
employees
whose
intelligence
is
valued
as
a
corporate
asset,
and
companies
that
can
learn.
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